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DETERMINING PERMISSIBLE MUNICIPAL
EXPENDITURES: THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE DOCTRINE REVIVED
An elementary premise of constitutional law is that public
funds may be spent only for public purposes.1 However there has
never been, nor is there now, any precise standard or test for
distinguishing public purposes from private purposes. 2 Courts
have stated only general guidelines: municipalities may spend
public money for purposes that are "a benefit to the community as
a body ' or conducive to the "public health, safety, morals, gener-
al welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the in-
habitants or residents" 4 of the community. 5 Judicial' countermand
of an authorized expenditure occurs only when the proposed use
or purpose is "obviously of a private character," 6 or it is "clearly
apparent that [the municipality's determination] is without reason-
' Opinion to the Governor, 76 R.I. 249. 255. 69 A.2d 531. 534 (1949). See also The
Liberty Bell. 23 F. 843 (1885); McLean v. City of Boston. 327 Mass. 118.97 N.E.2d 542
(1951); Hays v. City of Kalamazoo. 316 Mich. 443. 25 N.W.2d 787 (1947): Skutt v. City
of Grand Rapids. 275 Mich. 258. 266 N.W. 344 (1936); State ex rel. McClure v.
Hagerman. 155 Ohio St. 320, 98 N.E.2d 835 (1951): Webster v. Hopewell Borough. 19
Pa. Super. 549 (1902); Heimerl v. Ozaukee County. 256 Wis. 151.40 N.W.2d 564 (1949).
The mere fact that a private interest derives some benefit from the activity does not
deprive the activity of its public nature if its primary purpose is public. Visina v. Freeman.
252 Minn. 177. 89 N.W.2d 635 (1958). See also Perez v. San Jose. 107 Cal. App. 2d 562,
237 P.2d 548 (1951); Roseville v. Tulley. 55 Cal. App. 2d 601. 131 P.2d 395 (1942):
Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8.98 A.2d 523 (1953), State ex rel Bruestle v.
Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
2 In Barnes v. City of New Haven. 140 Conn. 8. 98 A.2d 523 (1953). the court stated.
"'Courts as a rule. instead of attempting judicially to define a public as distinguished from a
private purpose, have left each case to be determined by its own peculiar circumstances."
Id. at 15, 98 A.2d at 527. See also McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264. 59 A.2d 142
(1948); Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure. 264 N.C. 252. 141 S.E.2d 634 (1965); 2 E.
MCQUILLIN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.31 (3rd ed. rev. 1966), C. RHYNE. MUNICI-
PAL LAw343 (1957).
3 Port Authority of City of St. Paul v. Fisher. 269 Minn. 276. 288. 132 N.W.2d 183. 192
(1964).4 State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman. 155 Ohio St. 320, 325. 98 N.E.2d 835. 838
(1951).
1 An equally general test stated by McQuillin is "whether the expenditure confers a
direct benefit of reasonably general character to a significant part of the public, as
distinguished from a remote or theoretical benefit." 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 39.19 (3rd ed. rev. 1970).
6 Opinion to the Governor. 76 R.I. 249. 258. 69 A.2d 531. 535 (1949).
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able foundation," 7 or is "palpable [sic] and manifestly arbitrary
and incorrect." 8
Standards as vague as these allow municipalities considerable
freedom in determining the propriety of their expenditures and the
trend is to grant them even more? The lack of precise standards
makes it difficult for cities to determine the public or private
character of expenditures they wish to make,' 0 and makes any
consistent and rational judicial review improbable when municipal
determinations are tested in court."' Thus, assuming that the
integrity of the well-accepted principle allowing only "public"
expenditures' 2 is to be maintained, the courts must formulate
precise and workable standards for distinguishing public from
private purposes. Judicially provided guidelines might inject some
objectivity into an area of the law where it is presently lacking.' 3
This article surveys the criteria presently used by courts, com-
mentators, and city officials in determining whether an ex-
penditure of public funds is legally permissible.' 4 Each factor is
then reevaluated to ascertain its place in a new attempt to deter-
mine more consistently the nature of proposed expenditures.
7 City of Tulsa v. Williamson. 276 P.2d 209. 214 (Okla. 1954).
8 State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman. 155 Ohio St. 320, 325, 98 N.E.2d 835. 838
(1951).
9 See, e.g., Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8. 15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953):
"The modem trend of authority is to expand and liberally construe the meaning of 'public
purpose'." See also Ginsburg v. City and County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572. 436 P.2d 685
(1968); Gregory Marina. Inc. v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 364. 144 N.W.2d 503 (1966);
Sommers v. City of Flint, 355 Mich. 655. 96 N.W.2d 119 (1959); State ex rel.Gordon v.
Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951); Bland v. City of Taylor, 37 S.W.2d 291
(Tex. Civ, App. 1931), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. City of Taylor, 123 Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d
1033 (1934).
10 Interviews with officials in Michigan cities of various populations (Detroit, 1.5 11,482
people; Ann Arbor, 99,797; Jackson, 45,484; Albion. 12,112; and Brighton. 2,457. Data
from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS PC(l)-B24, Michigan (1970).)
revealed that. although the frequency of the need to determine the permissibility of an
expenditure varied (with cities of larger population having to confront the issue more
frequently), all the cities canvassed must decide whether an expenditure is public or
private and all confirm that the decision-making procedure is often unclear and that the
standards used are seldom explicit. Interview with Mr. Burcham, City Treasurer of
Albion, in Albion, Aug. 31, 1973; interview with Mr. Farris, Acting City Manager of
Jackson, in Jackson, Aug. 29, 1973; interview with Mr. Romer, City Manager of Brighton,
in Brighton, Aug. 30, 1973; interview with Mr. Sheehan, Assistant City Administrator of
Ann Arbor, in Ann Arbor, Apr. 26, 1973; interview with Mr. Teague, Assistant Director
of Bureau of the Budget of Detroit, in Detroit, Aug. 28, 1973 [hereinafter cited as
Interviews].
11 See notes 41-46 and accompanying text infra.
12 See note I and accompanying text supra.
13 The present status of the law in this area may be fairly characterized as determination
or definition by illustration. See, e.g., 15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, § 39, at 38-55,
where 113 examples are given of what are and what are not public purposes. Such
enumerations imply that other proper expenditures must be ejusdem generis. Until the
characteristics that define the term "public purpose" are isolated, cities and courts will not
be able to determine rationally the propriety of proposed expenditures.
14 It should be noted that the public-private dichotomy is used in the analysis of other
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1. CRITERIA TO DETERMINE THE
NATURE OF PROPOSED MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES
Six principal factors have been used by courts to determine
whether a particular proposed expenditure is actually for a public
rather than a private purpose. These factors are: prior character-
ization, legislative or voter approval, general economic benefit,
competition with private enterprise, number of beneficiaries, and
necessity because of infeasibility of private performance. Each
factor and its application will be considered seriatim.
Prior characterization of a particular type of expenditure is
frequently considered by cities, courts, and commentators in de-
termining whether a similar proposed use of public money is for a
public purpose. Thus under this standard, any purpose commonly
thought of as "public" is a proper use for public funds. For
instance, in Commonwealth v. Gingrich,15 the court reinforced its
doubts about the propriety of expenditures to entertain guests of
the city by noting that the expenditures had never been ap-
proved. 16 Similarly, in Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing
Authority,17 the court considered "whether a proposed extension
of governmental activity is in line with the historical development
of the Commonwealth.'
8
Some courts suggest that a formal declaration of approval by
the municipal legislative organ 9 or by popular vote helps to
determine whether an expenditure is public or private. Most
courts applying this criterion will not invalidate an expenditure
municipal problems. E.g., use of eminent domain powers, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St.
Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); governmental tort immunity, Hourigan v. City
of Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904); Quill v. Mayor of New York, 36 N.Y. App.
Div. 476, 55 N.Y.S. 889 (1899); Conelly v. Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262, 46 S.W. 565
(1897); tax exemption for city-owned property, People v. Doe G. 1,034, 36 Cal. 220
(1868); People ex rel. Mayor v. Assessors, Ill N.Y. 505, 19 N.E. 90 (1888); Wharf Co. v.
City of Galveston, 63 Tex. 14, (1884); and alienation of municipal property, Palmer v.
City of Albequerque, 19 N.M. 285, 142 P. 929 (1914); Board of Educ. v. Edson, 18 Ohio
St. 221 (1868). See Doddridge, Distinction between Governmental and Proprietary Func-
tions of Municipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1925), for a discussion of
possible differences in result when the aim of the inquiry is different.
15 21 Pa. Super. 286 (1902).
1 Id. at 290.
17304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939).
Is Id. at 293. 23 N.E.2d at 668. See also Schieffelin v. Hylan, 236 N.Y. 254. 262, 140
N.E. 689, 691 (1923), where the court noted "widespread opinion and general practice" in
considering expenditure for entertainment at a public celebration. Interviews with several
Michigan city officials disclosed that past usage and prior court approval or disapproval of
an expenditure is perhaps the single most important factor in their decisions as to the
permissibility of an expenditure. Interviews, supra note 10.19 Opinion to the Governor, 76 R.I. 249,258, 69 A.2d 531, 535 (1949):
While the ultimate determination of the character of the use or purpose is a
judicial and not a legislative question, yet where the legislature declares a
particular use or purpose to be a "public use" such a declaration must be
FALL 19731
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after it has been approved by the municipal legislative body or the
public without more substantial proof of the "private" nature of
the expenditure than might be required otherwise. 20
Another factor occasionally mentioned in determining the na-
ture of a proposed expenditure is the general economic benefit to
the city as a result of the -expenditure.21 If the resulting benefit is
general and substantial, the expenditure is deemed one for a
public purpose and therefore valid. The few courts which have
explicitly applied this standard have usually stated that general
economic improvement is not, in itself, sufficient to characterize
an expenditure as public. 22 Yet, expenditures that seem to have
little public character other than economic benefit are frequently
approved. 23 These approvals indicate that the criterion of "eco-
nomic benefit," although relatively infrequently discussed by
given weight and will control unless the use or purpose in question is
obviously of a private character.
See'also Hightower v. City of Raleigh. 150 N.C. 569. 65 S.E. 279 (1909).
In an opinion concerning the permissibility of using public funds to defray expenses of a
parade float representing Detroit at a Miami convention, the Detroit corporation counsel
noted.
"[A] legislative determination as to 'public purpose' or determination as to
what is not a proper appropriation, is given great weight by the courts." 9 OP.
DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL 93, 94 (1955).
20 Cf. Lewis v. City of Fort Worth. 126 Tex. 458. 463, 89 S.W.2d 975. 978 (1936):
[A] court has no right to substitute its judgment for the judgment and
discretion of the governing body upon which the law visits the primary power
and duty to act. Of course, if such governing body acts illegally, unreason-
ably. or arbitrarily, a court of competent jurisdiction may so adjudge, but
there the power of the court ends.
21 Cf. 15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5.22 See, e.g., State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223. 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957),
where the city offered to purchase a building to be constructed by a company and to lease
the building back to the company in order to induce the firm to locate in town. The court
noted:
It [the relocation of the company ] may produce employment for citizens of
the community. It may tend to balance a locally restricted economy. But
general benefit to the economy of a community does not justify the use of
public funds of the city unless it be for a public as distinguished from a
private purpose.
Id. at 230, 82 N.W.2d at 274. See also In re Town of Woolley, 75 Wash. 206, 211, 134 P.
825, 827 (1913), where the court observed, -[A]dded trade was all that/could come out of
it, and stimulation of trade has never been held to be either a governmental or municipal
function of cities and towns."
23 For example, all of the following cases approve either bond financing arrangements to
obtain or construct industrial facilities, or efforts to obtain or construct industrial facilities
directly out of current revenues: Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49. 57 So. 2d
629 (1952); Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So. 2d 175 (1050); Hackler v. Baker,
233 Ark. 690, 346 S.W.2d 677 (1961); Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Comm.,
150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 (1963); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75. 178 So.
799 (1938); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964); Village of Deming v.
Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956); McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203
Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958); Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 91 S.E.2d 660 (1956);
State ex rel. County Court v. Demus, 148 W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352 (1964).
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courts, may be of major importance in the decision-making pro-
cesses of courts and municipalities.
Cases also indicate that an expenditure is not for a public
purpose if it results in municipal competition with private enter-
prise. 24 While the justification for this view is never clearly articu-
lated by the courts, one possible reason for this limitation is the
problem of unfair competition. Most medium-sized cities, if they
were to engage in private enterprise, could exert considerable
economic power.25
A fifth test applied by courts is whether the proposed ex-
penditure benefits the citizenry as a whole, or benefits only a
limited number of individuals or businesses. Under this test, the
fewer the beneficiaries, the more "private" the purpose. 26
24 E.g., Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority. 304 Mass. 288, 293. 23
•N.E.2d 665, 667-68 (1939). where the court considered "whether private enterprise has in
the past failed or succeeded in supplying the want or in eradicating the evil." See Ferric v.
Sweeney. 34 Ohio 272. 72 N.E.2d 128 (1946). where a day care center operated by the
city without regard to the financial ability of those who used it. was successfully challenged
as constituting a convenience to those who needed no public help, and. as such, a private
venture in competition with private enterprise. See also Opinion of the Justices. 2 11 Mass.
624, 98 N.E. 611 (1912). where public housing projects that did not qualify as "slum
clearance" were successfully challenged. "The substance of [the project] is that the
Commonwealth is to go into the business of furnishing homes for people who have money
enough to pay rent and ultimately to become purchasers." Id. at 625. 98 N.E. at 612. In
Brighton, Michigan, some expenditures have been considered, but disapproved principally
because of supposed interference with local merchants. For example. the city con-
templated purchasing plastic garbage bags and distributing them to its residents at no cost
or at only a nominal charge. The project could have saved the city money in its refuse
collection operations and improved the city's curbside appearance, but the plan was not
approved. Competition with local merchants was cited as the reason. The Brighton City
Manager suggested that smaller cities may afford this consideration more importance than
do larger cities, because of the generally closer ties between city government and local
merchants. Interviews, supra note 10. Contra, Barnes v. City of New Haven. 140 Conn.
8. 18.98 A.2d 523. 529 (1953):
That the authority's operation of its parking facilities may involve some
incidental loss to private competitors constitutes no reason for holding' that
the act does not meet a legitimate public purpose. It is no constitutional
objection to the statute which provides for the development of parking
facilities "nor does it derogate from the public character of its objective, that
the Authority will to some extent conduct what may heretofore have been
regarded as a private enterprise; to hold otherwise would mean that the State
would be powerless, within constitutional limitations, to act in order to
preserve the health and safety of its people even though such action were
imperative and vital for the purpose."
(quoting McSorley v. Fitzgerald. 359 Pa. 264. 270. 59 A.2d 142. 145-46 (1948)).
25 The annual budget of Brighton. Michigan, a city of only approximately 2500. is nearly
$1,000,000. It may therefore be considered inequitable to allow "the people" as a unit to
compete with private individuals. Another possible reason is the belief that private enter-
prise ultimately provides better service at a lower cost. According to this view. tax dollars
are not as efficient, in the long run, as the same funds privately spent to acquire the same
service or commodity. A less theoretical rationale for applying this criterion is that judges
and city administrators may simply fear or object to a socialistic trend which they may
perceive as resulting from increasing governmental assumption of previously private ser-
vices.2 6 Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635. 643 (1958): 'IT[he courts
generally construe [public purposel to mean such an activity as will serve as a benefit to
F:ALL 19731
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Some expenditures confer a direct and immediate benefit on all
of a city's residents.2 7 Other expenditures are of immediate ben-
efit to only a few persons, with any benefit to the remainder of the
city's residents being indirect or deferred. 28 Courts have com-
mented that although the direct benefit is received by only a few,
this does not necessarily invalidate a municipal expenditure. For
example, in Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles,2 9 the nature of
an expenditure to build a road to, and ending upon, a privately
owned ranch was at issue. The court held that the expenditure,
despite the lack of widespread benefit, was nevertheless for a
"public purpose." 30 Similarly, in Beardsley v. City of Darling-
ton,31 an expenditure for a television translator tower, designed to
improve reception in some areas, was held valid despite the fact
that not all residents of the city benefitted. However, there has
never been any clearly delineated standard as to the number of
beneficiaries required for an expenditure to be "public."
A final criterion sometimes mentioned is the necessity for the
goods or services provided by the expenditure accompanied by
the community as a body . See also Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v.
Johnson. 226 N.C. I, 8-9, 36 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1946); Opinion to the Governor. 76 R.I.
249. 255. 69 A-.2d 531, 534 (1949). In 7 Op. DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL 673 (1947), the
Corporation Counsel determined that a proposed public expenditure to subsidize the
transportation expenses of veterans was impermissible. "In all cases where the question of
'public purpose' has been introduced, the courts have considered the term to mean
'general public purpose' for the benefit of all of the citizens of the state or municipality."
Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
27 Expenditures for water and sewage facilities, electrical power. and city parks confer a
direct benefit on all the residents of the municipality, or at least on all who wish to use the
facility or service. In the following cases expenditures for such purposes have been
approved: White v. Mayor and Council, 119 Ala. 476, 23 So. 999 (1898) (lighting);
Ragsdale v. Hargraves, 198 Ark. 614, 129 S.W.2d 967 (1939) (parks); Bank of Commerce
v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927) (water facilities); Marin Water and
Power Co.. v. Town of Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 143 P. 767 (1914) (waterworks and
electric lights); City of Colorado Springs v. Pikes Peak Hydro-Electric Co.. 57 Colo. 169.
140 P. 921 (1914) (street lighting); Brandon v. County of Pinellas, 141 So. 2d 278 (Fla.
App. 1962) (parks); Loring v. Commissioner of Public Works, 264 Mass. 460. 163 N.E.
82 (1928) (water supply); Wright v. Walcott. 238 Mass. 432. 131 N.E. 291 (1921) (parks);
Kelley v. Merry, 262 N.Y. 151. 186 N.E. 425 (1933) (street lighting); Kraus v. City of
Cleveland, 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (water flouridation); Dickinson v. Salt Lake
City, 57 Utah 530. 195 P. 1110 (1921) (sewage lines and drains).
28 Expenditures to subsidize continuing education of municipal officers are not unusual.
even though only the individual directly benefits. Interviews, supra note 10. However.
cities may feel that the benefit to the individual eventually will result in indirect benefit to
the cities in terms of more efficient service. See, e.g., Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50
S.E.2d 545 (1948). where a law enforcement official was sent, at municipal expense, for
specialized training to Washington, D.C.. and the appropriation was upheld.
29 262 U.S. 700 (1922).
3 0 The Court stated: "It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any
considerable portion, should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to
constitute a public use." Id. at 707.
31 14 Wis. 2d 369, II1 N.W.2d 184 (1961).
FALL 1973] Permissible Municipal Expenditures
the infeasibility of private provision of the items. 3 2 If private
enterprise is unable or unwilling to provide a service or good and
there is a need for it, there is a great likelihood that a municipal
expenditure to finance provision of the service or good will be
characterized as "public." 33 In order to satisfy this test, a very
serious need for a service or commodity must exist, and it must
fall to the city to perform by default; that is, there must be no
expectation of private performance. Increased convenience to
residents does not qualify as necessity.3 4 Furthermore, the need
must relate to the health or safety of residents. Lack of housing
for persons who cannot afford decent shelter would qualify as a
legitimate public need.35 Physical disasters, such as fire, flood, and
32 In Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority. 304 Mass. 288. 23 N.E.2d
665 (1939). the court considered as a possible factor "whether a special emergency exists.
such as may be brought about by war or public calamity." Id. at 293. 23 N.E.2d 668.
Similarly. in Opinion to the Governor. 76 R.I. 249, 69 A.2d 531 (1949). it was said that a
public purpose could be found when the government is
furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those matters of public
necessity. convenience, or welfare, which, on account of their peculiar char-
acter. and the difficulty-perhaps impossibility-of making provision for
them otherwise, it is alike proper, useful, and needful for the government to
provide.
Id. at 255. 69 A.2d at 534. See also Opinion of the Justices. 320 Mass. 773, 67 N.E.2d
588 (1946); ANN ARBOR CITY CHARTER, ch. 8, § 8.17(i) (1956):
In case of fire. flood, or other calamity. the Council may subject to law
authorize the issuance of emergency bonds which shall be general obligations
of the City for the relief of the inhabitants of the City and for the pres-
ervation of municipal property.
33 All the municipal officials interviewed stated that recourse to the justification of
necessity is common, particularly where the city charter explicitly approves emergency
expenditures. Interviews, supra note 10. Cf. ANN ARBOR CITY CHARTER, ch. 8, § 8.17(i)
(1956). supra note 32; DETROIT CITY CHARTER, tit. III, ch. I. § 12(f) (1973):
The legislative powers and duties of the ICommon] Council shall be as
follows; ... To borrow money upon the faith and credit of the city upon
bonds to be issued as herein prescribed; provided that in case of exigency
involving the peace, health or safety of the people of the city, loans may be
authorized without issuing bonds ....
See also 9 OP. DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL 90 (1955), where the city sought to determine
whether wage increases would qualify as an "emergency" appropriation, so as to justify
reopening the budget.
a4 In Ferrie v. Sweeny. 34 Ohio 272. 72 N.E.2d 128 (1946). convenience was the only
justification advanced for offering publicly financed day care to children of financially able
parents. The use was declared "'private." "[T]he bestowal of care at public expense to
children of those whose financial condition does not require it, is an expenditure of public
funds for a private purpose." Id. at 133.
See also 9 OP. DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL 536 (1958). for a similar determination on
identical facts. and 9 OP. DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL 167 (1966), where a proposal to
subsidize the public transportation expenses of senior citizens was held improper:
The use of tax monies to bestow a subsidized fare upon any persons whose
financial condition does not require it as a part of poor relief is an ex-
penditure of public funds for a private and not a public purpose. Such a
procedure, we feel, would be found by the Courts to be an unjustified use of
tax monies.
Id. at 167.
35See Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 567. 8 N.E.2d 753 (1937). The court sug-
gested that actual and demonstrable slum conditions coupled with a shortage of adequate
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wind damage, and civil disorders leaving citizens homeless or
without food would also satisfy the health and safety requirement.
These criteria, although used or mentioned by courts, fail to
provide a needed objectivity in the determination of proper mu-
nicipal expenditures. The reason that no objective standard has
emerged is the lack of consistent application of the criteria and the
significant disagreement as to their relative importance. Thus, a
need exists for a thorough reevaluation of these criteria and a
more definite statement of the meaning of the familiar phrase
"public purpose."
I1. SUGGESTED RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
OF PARTICULAR CRITERIA
A. Prior Characterization
Courts and municipalities should give relatively little weight to
prior characterization of an expenditure by other cities, courts,
and commentators when considering the permissibility of an ex-
penditure. Reliance upon approved past usage of public funds is
of no avail when general characterization is either nonexistent or
inconsistent. Past usage is also of little value when novel uses for
public money are challenged, unless courts or cities are willing to
limit public purposes to those for which prior appropriations have
been approved.A6 For expenditures previously challenged in court,
judicial precedent may aid a city in deciding whether a similar
expenditure is permissible. However, lack of precedent or me-
chanical reliance on prior characterization may deter innovative,
though proper, municipal expenditures. Furthermore, as one court
put it, "views as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary
with changing conceptions of the scope and functions of govern-
housing elsewhere would justify public housing projects. Slum clearance and low cost
housing construction projects are commonly approved. See, e.g., Rowe v. Housing Au-
thority. 220 Ark. 698, 249 S.W.2d 551 (1952); People ex rel Gutknecht v. City of
Chicago, 414 I1. 600, 11 N.E.2d 626 (1953); Miller v. City of Louisville. 321 S.W.2d
237 (Ky. 1959); Rutherford v. City of Great Falls. 107 Mont, 512, 86 P.2d 656 (1939);
Lennox v. Housing Authority. 137 Neb. 582. 290 N.W. 451 (1940); Murray v. La-
Guardia. 291 NY. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943); Ferch v. Housing Authority. 79 N.D. 764,
59 N.W.2d 849 (1953); State ex rel. Breustle v. Rich. 159 Ohio St. 13. 110 N.E. 2d 778
(1953); McNulty v. Owens. 188 S.C. 377. 199 S.E. 425 (1938); Knoxville Housing
Authority v. City of Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76. 123 S.W.2d 1085 (1939). See also Opinion
of the Justices. 211 Mass. 624. 98 N.E. 611 (1912). in which a housing project was
declared improper where the proposed occupants did not require financial assistance in
securing housing.
36 The officials interviewed, particularly those in the smaller cities, indicated that the
absence of any precedent supporting an identical expenditure often has the practical effect
of foreclosing consideration of the expenditure. Interviews. supra note 10.
[VOL. 7:225
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ment, so that today there are familiar examples of such use which
formerly would not have been so considered."37 For example, a
contribution for support of or participation in municipal leagues
was once routinely held an improper private expenditure.3 8 The
prevailing attitude has changed, however, and now these ex-
penditures are quite uniformly approved.3 9 Appropriations for
recreational or cultural facilities were also commonly classified as
private uses;40 many such expenditures are approved as proper
public purposes today.4 1 Ascertaining the past characterization of
an expenditure may be just as difficult as the ultimate determina-
tion of its current propriety. 42
Even if prior characterization of an expenditure has been con-
sistent,43 the importance accorded former determinations should
37 Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority. 331 Pa. 209. 221. 200 A. 834. 840 (1938).38 See. e.g., City of Phoenix v. Michael, 61 Ariz. 238. 148 P.2d 353 (1944); Town of
Farmington v. Miner. 133 Me. 162. 175 A. 219 (1934); Waters v. Bonvouloir. 172 Mass.
286. 52 N.E. 500 (1899); and State ex rel. Thomas v. Semple, 112 Ohio St. 559, 148 N.E.
342 (1925).
Municipal leagues. such as the Michigan Municipal League. are voluntary statewide
cooperative organizations composed of cities, villages, and other local governmental units.
Their purpose is mutual benefit from the exchange of knowledge and expertise gained by
city administrators. Regional organizations (e.g., Southeastern Michigan Council of Gov-
ernments) and national organizations (e.g., National League of Cities) also exist. There are
similar organizations composed of particular city officials or employees, for example.
conferences of mayors or of city controllers. Interview with Mr. Robert Fryer, Director of
the Michigan Municipal League, in Ann Arbor, Michigan. April 30. 1973.3 9 See, e.g., City of Glendale v. White. 67 Ariz. 231, 194 P.2d 435 (1948); City of
Roseville v. Tulley, 55 Cal. App. 2d 601: 131 P.2d 395 (1942); People ex rel. Schlaeger v.
Bunge Bros. Coal Co.. 392 Ill. 153, 64 N.E.2d 365 (1945): Hays v. City of Kalamazoo.
316 Mich. 443. 25 N.W.2d 787 (1947); Tousley v. Leach. 180 Minn. 293. 230 N.W. 788
(1930); and State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320. 98 N.E.2d 835 -(1951).
Every state except Hawaii has a statewide municipal league organization. and the rate of
participation in these organizations is typically very high. For example, in Michigan
slightly over 98 percent of all incorporated cities and villages are dues-paying members of
the Michigan Municipal League. Interview with Mr. Robert Fryer. Director of the Mich-
igan Municipal League, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 30. 1973.4 0 See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. King, 132 Fla. 273. 181 So. 1 (1938) (It was held
impermissible to own and operate a golf course.); Brooks v. Town of Brooklyn. 146 Iowa
136. 124 N.W. 868 (1910) (The construction and operation of an opera house was held
impermissible.); Historical Pageant Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia. 260 Pa. 447. 103 A. 824
(1918) (It was an improper expenditure to subsidize a non-profit organization which
presented public programs recalling important civic occurrences.).
4 1 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 567, 8 N.E.2d 753 (1937) (public
memorial to sailors and a marine park); Rivet v. Burdick, 255 App. Div. 131, 6 N.Y.S.2d
79 (1938) (parks and toboggan slides); City of Greensboro v. Smith, 241 N.C. 363, 85
S.E.2d 292 (1955) (war memorials); City of Cleveland v. Lausche. 70 Ohio App. 273. 49
N.E.2d 207 (1943) (zoological garden); Sambor v. Hadley. 291 Pa. 395. 140 A. 347 (1928)
(commemoration of the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration
of Independence); Hill v. Roberts, 142 Tenn. 215. 217 S.W. 826 (1920) (war memorials);
and Goodnight v. City of Wellington. 15 S.W.2d 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (estab-
lishment and maintenance of a city band).
42 For an argument that the historical usage test is at best inconclusive where the
public-private dichotomy determines tort liability, see Note. Municipal Corporations:
Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REv.910 (1936).
43 Cases approving street lighting. 'for example, have been consistent. See White v.
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be slight. 4 4 The reasoning underlying a prior characterization may
be useful to a court in making a new determination, but mechan-
ical application of prior case law should be avoided. 5 On the
other hand, judicial recognition of a general usage may assist
cities in assessing the likelihood of a challenge to a proposed
expenditure. 46 Even if the appropriation is contested, its propriety
should be determined without regard to the customary character-
ization of the expenditure.
B. Legislative or Voter Approval
Some courts believe that a formal legislative finding as to the
public or private nature of an appropriation, or the submission of
the issue to a popular vote, lends weight to the resulting determi-
nation. There seems to be confusion between a city's manifesta-
tion of intent to appropriate public money for a given purpose,
and its capacity to legitimize the expenditure by its act of approv-
al. Cities often appropriate money by resolution of the city coun-
cil, by act of an executive officer, by a vote of the electorate, or by
some combination of these devices. Implicit in approval of any
expenditure is the decision-maker's wish to spend the money and
belief that the expenditure is lawful. Nevertheless, an express
desire to spend municipal funds in a particular way by no means
assures that the use is "public." Ratification by formal findings or
electoral results need not have any effect on the nature of the
expenditure; the decision-maker cannot be wrong about the wish
to spend the money, although he may be wrong about the per-
missibility of the expenditure. 47 The public purpose doctrine
Mayor and Council, 119 Ala. 476, 23 So. 999 (1898); Kelley v. Merry, 262 NY. 151. 186
N.E. 425, rev'g 239 App. Div. 758, 263 N.Y.S. 282 (1933); City of Colorado Springs v.
Pikes Peak Hydro-Electric Co., 57 Colo. 169, 140 P. 921 (1914); Carroll v. City of Cedar
Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N.W. 652 (1935); Waddle v. City of Somerset. 281 Ky. 30, 134
S.W.2d 956 (1939); Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, 264 N.C. 252, 141 S.E.2d 634 (1965).
44 Of those courts which have confronted the issue, most agree that favorable past usage
is not essential to a finding of a "public" purpose. Several cases explicitly state that
"... novelty should impose no veto" to a finding of permissibility. See Sun Printing &
Publishing Ass'n v. City of New York. 40 N.Y.S. 607. 612. 8 App. Div. 230. 238 aff'd,
152 N.Y. 257, 46 N.E. 499 (1896); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority. 331 Pa.
209. 221. 200 A. 834,840 (1938).
45 See. e.g.. Hood v. Mayor and Aldermen. 83 Mass. (I Allen) 103. 106 (1861): "'An
unlawful expenditure of the money of a town cannot be rendered valid by usage. however
long continued."
4 The officials interviewed indicated that their confidence in the propriety of an ex-
penditure is proportionate to the precedent and usage supporting the expenditure. In-
terviews. supra note 10.
47 It is settled law that the determination by a city is not binding upon the courts. See
notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra for illustrations of judicial correction of erroneous
determinations. See also 8 Or. DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL 85 (1942). for an acknowl-
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should be applied in a way that protects a citizen's freedom from
taxation for expenditures which independent judicial scrutiny
would disapprove. Therefore, the characterization of public ex-
penditures should be independent of citizen reaction.
C. General Economic Benefit
General economic benefit is neither necessary nor sufficient for
showing a public purpose. Many admittedly permissible ex-
penditures result in no economic benefit, 48 while other ex-
penditures which produce such a benefit are impermissible. 49
Despite the inconclusiveness of the presence or absence of an
economic benefit resulting from an expenditure, this factor could
be given some role in evaluating the nature of an expenditure. If
economic benefit were to assume much importance, however,
there is danger that confusion about the ultimate issue to be
resolved might result. Economic desirability is an important prac-
tical element in determining which expenditures are made, 50 but
desirability and constitutionality are distinct concepts. 51 There is
no apparent legal reason for prohibiting cities from making eco-
nomically undesirable expenditures. This distinction between de-
sirability and legality should be emphasized by confining the fac-
tor of economic benefit to a minor role in the determination of the
permissibility of municipal expenditures.
edgement that a determination by the City Council that an emergency exists, so as to
justify extraordinary expenditures, is subject to review by the courts and is not conclusive.
A similar opinion on the same issue is 9 Op. DETROIT CORP. COUNSEL90 (1955).48 No economic benefit is even indirectly apparent as a result of an appropriation for
construction of a water flouridation plant. although health reasons might justify the ex-
penditure. Kraus v. City of Cleveland. 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (water flourida-
tion expenses approved). Similarly, expenditures for many of the safety measures of a city
are permitted even though they might fail to enhance the local economy. Mayor and
Alderman v. Rumsey & Co.. 63 Ala. 352 (1879) (fire equipment); Stewart v. Schoonma-
ker. 50 Kan. 573, 32 P. 913 (1893) (fire equipment); Tonn v. Strehlau. 265 Wis. 250. 61
N.W.2d 486 (1953) (fire equipment). Typically health and safety expenses consume a
sizeable portion of a city's budgeted capital. For example, in Detroit's 1973-74 budget.
the combined total allocations for the fire, police, health and sanitation departments
accounted for $247,580,677, or almost 35% of the entire budget. Data from the 1973-74
Budget for the City of Detroit.
49 See note 26 and accompanying text supra.5 0 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
51 This distinction was drawn by the Supreme Court when it disclaimed any authority to
legislate policy while asserting its authority to prevent unconstitutional actions. See
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court limited itself as
follows: "it is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or
disadvantages of such a centralized system [as that set up under the NIRA codes of fair
competition]. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it."
Id. at 549. See also Opinion to the Governor, 76 R.I. 249. 274, 69 A.2d 531, 543 (1949)
(dissenting opinion):
In more recent years. however, some courts appear to have adopted a
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D. Competition With Private Enterprise
The term "competition" is so imprecise that any standard con-
sidering competition with private enterprise cannot be con-
sistently applied without proscribing all municipal expenditures.
"Competition" might be defined as only the displacement of a
currently operating private enterprise, thereby causing it econom-
ic loss, but a municipality's usurpation of a private entrepreneur's
future expansion market is also competition since the municipal
activity bars private entry.52 Thus any expenditure by a city that
offers a service or good competes, in some sense, with private
enterprise if a profit could be made by a private firm offering the
same service or good. Unless the term competition is somehow
limited, all municipal expenditures seem to compete improperly
with the private sector.
In many cases judicial approval has been given municipal ex-
penditures despite the presence of competition with private enter-
prise. One city permanently operated a fuel yard at cost; no doubt
competing with private industry; the expenditure was upheld. 53
Furthermore, city-operated hospitals or health clinics compete
with private hospitals and private physicians' offices, but chal-
lenges have not succeeded.5 4 Municipal parking structures 55 are
another common example of a municipally provided service that
competes with privately offered services. The list could be ex-
tended.56 Thus municipal expenditures are regularly approved by
so-called "'liberal" view by expanding the meaning and extending the appli-
cation of "public use" so as to support the exercise of eminent domain in
,cases which would not reasonably come within the primary meaning of public
use. Many of such decisions seem to me to confuse that which may be
merely beneficial or desirable as a matter of public policy with the con-
stitutional meaning of public use ....5 2 See P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS ch. 24-25 (5th ed. 1961).
53 Laughlin v. City of Portland. II1 Me. 486.90 A. 318 (1914).54 See, e.g., Hamilton v. City of Anniston, 249 Ala. 479, 31 So. 2d 715 (1947); Lien v.
City of Ketchikan. 383 P.2d 721 (Alas. 1963); State v. City of Fort Lauderdale. 149 Fla.
177, 5 So. 2d 263 (1941): People exrel. Royal v. Cain. 410 Ill. 39, 101 N.E.2d 74 (1951);
Finan v. Mayor and City Council. 154 Md. 563. 141 A. 269 (,1928).55 See, e.g., Brodhead v. City of Denver. 126 Colo. 119,247 P.2d 140 (1952); Barnes v.
City of New Haven. 140 Conn. 8. 98 A.2d 523 (1953); Florida v. City of Jacksonville. 53
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1951); Michigan Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chicago Park Dist.. 412 Ill. 350.
106 N.E.2d 359 (1952); City of Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judges. 339 Mich. 62, 62
N.W.2d 626 (1954); Parr v. Ladd. 323 Mich. 592, 36 N.W.2d 157 (1949); De Lorenzo v.
City of Hackensack, 9 N.J. 379.88 A.2d 511 (1952); State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 158
Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E.2d 206 (1952).
56 In smaller cities, refuse collection is often contracted out to private companies. This is
done in Brighton, Michigan. Interviews, supra note 10. If the city were to institute its own
garbage collection service, the necessary expenditure would be proper. despite the obvious
resultant competition. People ex rel. Toman v. New York Central Lines. 380 II. 58 1. 44
N.E.2d 549 (1942) (garbage collection expenses approved). Similarly, Detroit owns and
operates a power generating system for lighting public streets and buildings. This munici-
pal system diminishes the market of Detroit Edison Company, the principle private power
supplier. Interviews, supra note 10.
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courts in spite of possible public competition with private enter-
prise.
E. Number of Beneficiaries
This criterion deserves increased importance in determining
permissible public expenditures. Two questions arise when con-
sidering the number of beneficiaries: who are the relevant bene-
ficiaries and what types of benefits are germane.
Courts frequently assume without explanation that benefit from
an expenditure is proper only if the beneficiaries are residents of
the city or persons within its confines for whom it is responsible. 57
The assumption seems correct, for the underlying premise of
municipal incorporation is that this governmental form best pools
the resources of the city's residents and most efficiently manages
them for the provision of necessary or helpful community ser-
vices. Charters of incorporation generally embody this assump-
tion.5 8
An expenditure may be "public" even though only a portion of
the city's residents are benefitted. The first justification for such
an expenditure is that, in some cases, the entire community has a
special interest in seeing a few residents benefitted. For example,
the beneficiaries may be public officials or employees in direct
service to the entire community. 59 Special police or detective
57 E.g., Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177. 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958): [The
courts generally construe [public purpose] to mean such an activity as will serve as a
benefit to the community as a body .... " Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v.
Johnson. 226 N.C. 1. 8-9, 36 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1946):
"Public Purpose" as we conceive the term to imply, when used in con-
nection with the expenditure of municipal funds from the public treasury.
refers to such public purpose within the frame of governmental and proprieta-
ry power given to the particular municipality, to be exercised for the benefit.
welfare and protection of its inhabitants and others coming within the manic-
ipal care. [Emphasis added.]
58 ANN ARBOR CITY CHARTER (1956). Preamble:
We, the Peopleof the City of Ann Arbor, in order to secure the benefits of
efficient self government and otherwise to promote our common welfare, do
ordain and establish this charter for the government of our city. IEmphasis
added.]
[Tihe City shall have the power ... to do any acts to advance the in-
terests, good government, and prosperity of the City and its inhabitants, and
general welfare. [Emphasis added. I
Id. ch. 3, § 3.1.
59 Many cases involve municipal payment of legal fees of public officials. The only direct
beneficiary is the official, but the entire community has an interest in paying the defense
costs to encourage qualified men to seek or accept public office. See, e.g., Miller v.
Carbonelli. 80 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1955); Whelan v. Town of Hingham. 348 Mass. 402, 204
N.E.2d 118 (1965); Chandler v. Saenz. 315 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); and
Cheesebrew v. Town of Point Pleasant, 71 W. Va. 199, 76 S.E. 424 (1912). If the matter
litigated did relate to improper use of official power. then the community's interest is quite
different. See, e.g., State ex rel. Flagg v. City of Bedford. 2 Ohio App. 2d 300, 304, 208
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training for law enforcement officials is an instance of direct
benefit to a few persons because they provide services to the
community. 60 Municipal assistance to veterans, often in the form
of housing subsidization, 61 has also been characterized as aid to
persons serving the community. The second justification for ex-
penditures which directly benefit only a part of the entire commu-
nity is that the remainder of the community has been or will be
similarly benefitted. City-funded special-interest programs of lim-
ited appeal may be justified as part of a series of special-interest
programs covering the whole range of concerns of the city's
residents. 2 For example, bookmobiles and mobile swimming
pools would qualify if their locations were changed to canvass the
entire community. New services may be inaugurated in steps,
benefitting only a few at first.63 Thus, although the benefit derived
N.E.2d 146, 149 (1956): "Private obligations unconnected with the services required of an
officer or employee of a municipality in furtherance of the duties of his office or employ-
ment cannot be assumed, even if so directed by the legislative authority." InFlagg, the
mayor induced the papers to print an alleged libel of the city's former director of law. See
also Peet v. Leinbaugh, 180 Iowa 937. 164 N.W. 127 (1917) (Mayor may not recover legal
expense of suing for compensation he was not entitled to receive.); Kilroe v. Craig. 208
App. Div. 93, 203 N.Y.S. 71 (1924) (Former assistant district attorney was not entitled to
reimbursement for legal fees incurred in defending himself from a charge of misconduct in
office.); and City of Del Rio v. Lowe. Il l S.W.2d 1208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (Commis-
sioners could not recover expenses for defense from offenses alleged to have been com-
mitted by them against the city.).60 E.g., Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948), where a town spent
public funds to send a police officer to the National Police Academy and the expenditure
was upheld. The more frequent expenditures which benefit persons serving the city are
pension and disability assistance to city employees. Such expenditures are routinely
approved. See, e.g., Adamson v. City of Little Rock, 199 Ark. 435, 134 S.W.2d 558
(1939) (pensions for firemen); and Hammitt v. Gaynor, 82 Misc. 196, 144 N.Y.S. 123,
(Sup. Ct. 1913) (pensions for all city workers).
6' The following cases approved municipal expenditures to provide special housing
benefits to veterans: City of Phoenix v. Superior Court of Maricopa County. 65 Ariz. 139,
175 P.2d 811 (1946); Franco v. City of New Haven, 133 Conn. 544, 52 A.2d 866 (1947);
Opinion of the Justices, 320 Mass. 773, 67 N.E.2d 588 (1946); and Ferch v. Housing
Authority, 79 N.D. 764.59 N.W.2d 849 (1953).
In some instances, as in Opinion of the Justices, supra, a finding that a housing shortage
exists also may have justified the expenditures on necessity grounds. See note 40 and
accompanying text supra.62 E.g., Lewis v. LaGuardia, 172 Misc. 82, 14 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1939). which approved
city financing of radio broadcasts of speeches with religious overtones made by prominent
persons at "Communion Breakfasts.- The court conceded that the interest in hearing any
given speaker might be slight, but found that the series as a whole appealed to much of the
listening public.
63 There ought to be a special concern when the beneficiary group comprises less than
the entire population of the city and when a fee is charged for the service or commodity to
partially offset its cost. If an expenditure results in offering a service or good for a price,
four requirements might be imposed: 1) The price must reasonably reflect the cost of the
service or good; the city is not chartered to make money, but to serve its residents. 2) The
commodity or service must be available to all residents on equal terms, without dis-
crimination as to race, duration of residence in the city,- or income. 3) The price charged
must be within the economic means of a large proportion of the community. For example,
an expenditure to develop a pleasure-boat marina would be impermissible if the only users
were those who could pay a large rental fee for a boat slip. 4) If the demand outruns the
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from municipal expenditures must primarily accrue to the resi-
dents of the city, there is no requirement that all residents directly
benefit from a given expenditure.
The more difficult question is what types of benefits are rele-
vant to a determination of an expenditure's nature. Economic or
material advantages are the usual benefits to city residents from
municipal expenditures, 64 but "benefit" could embrace more than
economic or physical advantage. Satisfaction from fulfilling a per-
ceived moral duty is also of value and may be desired by city
residents. Public expenditures can even satisfy spiritual and emo-
tional needs of the citizenry. Whether these psychological benefits
should be cognizable in the characterization of municipal ex-
penditures rarely has been considered.
Some types of nonmaterial benefits might be excluded from
consideration on either of two grounds. First, certain types of
benefits are more easily verifiable than others. Material benefits
are physically observable; economic improvements are reflected
in property assessments, tax reductions, or business receipts.
Aesthetic enjoyment from gazing at a park fountain or from listen-
ing to the city symphony is more difficult to gauge, but the number
of gazers or concert-goers may indicate the benefit derived. In
contrast, some benefits such as the satisfaction of performing a
perceived moral duty, result in no obvious objectively verifiable
benefit. For example, moral considerations might underlie a
request to a city council to make a good will contribution to aid
natural disaster victims or war refugees of foreign countries.
Thus, where benefits from municipal expenditures are difficult or
impossible to verify, the expenditures could be labeled "private."
A second factor, as a practical matter, excludes certain ex-
penditures for nonmaterial benefits from judicial consideration.
This is the principle that an expenditure will be characterized on
the basis of the primary or principal intended 6enefit.65 Theo-
supply of the commodity or service, then availability must recur at reasonable intervals;
there must be some assurance that the expenditure will not exclusively benefit the few
who, by chance, are the first to receive its advantage.
64 See notes 26- 27 and accompanying text supra.
6See, e.g., Port Authority v. Fisher. 269 Minn. 276, 132 N.W.2d 183 (1964). where
the court stated:
The mere fact that some private interests may derive an incidental benefit
from the activity does not deprive the activity of its public nature if its
primary purpose is public. On the other hand, if the primary object is to
promote some private end, the expenditure is illegal, although it may in-
cidentally also serve some public purpose.
Id. at 288, 132 N.W.2d at 192 (emphasis added). Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke
Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288. 292-93, 23 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1939): " [Tlhe cases
tend to distinguish between those results which are primary and those which are secondary
or incidental and to classify the object according to its primary consequences and effects."
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retically this restriction disfavors no particular type of benefit, but
as a practical matter, cities rarely spend money where the primary
intended benefit is nonmaterial. When expenditures for nonmate-
rial benefits are made, they should, of course, receive due consid-
eration by the courts, even though such spending is usually an
insignificant part of a city's budget. These two factors may justify
excluding the satisfaction of felt moral duties from the category of
relevant benefits.
The number of beneficiaries of an expenditure should be given
increased importance by the courts and cities. This criterion
should be modified, as outlined above, to require that all the city's
residents benefit roughly equally from the expenditure, or at least
that the benefit be available to each resident on roughly equal
terms. If inequality exists it should be justified by limited special
circumstances.
F. Necessity and Infeasibility of
Private Performance
The problem with the necessity criterion is that it might negate
any other limitation on municipal spending if it could be too easily
invoked. To keep the use of necessity as a justification within
some confines, cities could be required to declare formally the
emergency at the time of the expenditure, stating with particular-
ity the factual data underlying the determination. This formal
declaration would enable reviewing courts to compare the actual
needs of similarly situated municipalities. An open and thorough
factual evaluation is an uncertain check on abuses, but it may be
the only sensible check available.
If the restrictions on declaring an emergency and presenting the
underlying factual data are enforced, the necessity criterion may
be a workable indicator of proper public spending, giving cities
the leeway to make extraordinary disbursements when warranted
by the needs of their residents.
III. CONCLUSION
In the past, the standards used by the courts and cities to
determine the public or private character of municipal expenditure
have been neither clearly articulated nor consistently applied. The
See also 15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, at 31: "However, if the primary object is to
subserve a public municipal purpose, it is immaterial that, incidentally, private ends may
be advanced."
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test may have been the satisfaction of some combination of the six
criteria discussed in this article. Only two of the criteria-the
number of beneficiaries and the necessity of the ex-
penditure-have a proper role in determining the permissibility of
municipal expenditures. Emphasis on the number of beneficiaries
should be the central element in a more open and consistent
approach to the question. The notion of necessity, properly safe-
guarded, can provide the flexibility required for the system of
municipal appropriations.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that determining the issue
consistently and objectively should be valued more highly than
utilizing any particular relative weighting given to the different
factors. Although mistakes may be made by openly emphasizing
the wrong elements, at least there will be some basis on which to
evaluate the determinations and to discover the mistakes. Formu-
lating a rational and critical procedure for determining public
purpose is indeed difficult, but that is no reason to despair of
attempting to devise one.
-Richard A. Van Wert
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